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Abstract 
Background and Aim: Public health policy development is subject to a range of stakeholders 
presenting their arguments to influence opinion on the best options for policy action. This 
paper compares stakeholders’ positions in the discourse networks of two pricing policy 
debates in the UK: Minimum Unit Pricing for alcohol (MUP) and the Soft Drinks Industry 
Levy (SDIL). 
Design: Discourse analysis was combined with network visualisation to create 
representations of stakeholders’ positions across the two policy debates as they were 
represented in 11 national UK newspapers. 
Setting: United Kingdom. 
Observations: For the MUP debate 1,924 statements by 152 people from 87 organisations 
were coded from 348 articles. For the SDIL debate 3,883 statements by 214 people from 175 
organisations were coded from 511 articles. 
Measurements: Network analysis techniques were used to identify robust argumentative 
similarities and maximise the identification of network structures. Network measures of 
size, connectedness and cohesion were used to compare discourse networks. 
Findings: The networks for both pricing debates involve a similar range of stakeholder types 
and form clusters representing policy discourse coalitions. The SDIL network is larger than 
the MUP network, particularly the proponents’ cluster with over three times as many 
stakeholders. Both networks have tight clusters of manufacturers, think tanks, and 
commercial analysts in the opponents’ coalition. Public health stakeholders appear in both 
networks, but no health charity or advocacy group is common to both.  
Conclusion: A comparison of the discourse in the UK press during the policy development 
processes for Minimum Unit Pricing for alcohol and the Soft Drinks Industry Levy suggests 
greater cross-sector collaboration among policy opponents than proponents.  
 
Keywords: Alcohol, sugar-sweetened beverages, health, policy, public health, discourse 
networks.  
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Introduction 
The global rise in Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) can be understood as 
‘industrial epidemics’ driven at least in part by powerful corporations and their allies 
promoting products that are also disease agents (1). Decades of mounting evidence on the 
tobacco industry highlighted its detrimental effect on health and brought about the 
introduction of upstream policies targeting price, marketing and availability. More recently, 
UK public health policy makers have turned their attention to upstream policy interventions 
targeting alcohol and sugar. There is growing evidence that the alcohol industry and ultra-
processed food and drink industry use similar strategies to the tobacco industry to 
undermine effective public health policies (2-4).  
Public health policy development is subject to a range of stakeholders presenting 
their arguments in the news media on the best options for policy action (5-7). In this 
respect, the news media can be seen as important in contributing to agenda setting (8) and 
in shaping public and policy opinion on the acceptability of public health policies (9-11). Two 
recent examples of controversial pricing policy options that prompted intense media 
debates across the UK were, Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) for alcohol and the Soft Drinks 
Industry Levy (SDIL). Both policy options were considered by the UK Government. However, 
while the SDIL was implemented across the UK in 2018, the introduction of MUP in England 
was placed on hold indefinitely in 2013, despite being included in the UK Government’s 
2012 Alcohol Strategy (12). Meanwhile, in June 2012, the Scottish Government passed the 
Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) Scotland Act 2012, paving the way for MUP in Scotland (13). 
The MUP pricing policy targets the sale of cheap, high-strength alcohol to reduce 
alcohol consumption and related harms. After a failed legal challenge (14), in May 2018 a 
minimum price of 50p per unit was implemented in Scotland (15). Arguments in support of 
MUP, appearing in the UK press, largely related to concerns about high levels of problem 
drinking; its effect on public health and public order; and a widespread belief that most of 
the alcohol that contributes to drunken behaviour is irresponsibly priced and sold (7, 16). 
Key opposing arguments in the debate positioned the policy as an illegal barrier to fair trade 
that would harm the economy and penalise responsible drinkers (7). 
Public Health England’s report, ‘Sugar Reduction: The evidence for action’, 
highlighted the high levels of sugar consumption and associated health harms (17). The 
report recommended a broad range of measures, including the introduction of a tax on high 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
sugar products. In the March 2016 budget, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George 
Osborne, announced the Conservative Government’s intention to introduce the SDIL (18). 
They intended that the SDIL would encourage producers to reformulate products with a 
reduced sugar content, to avoid paying the levy (19). Following a consultation period, the 
levy was introduced in April 2018 and set at 18 pence per litre on soft drinks with a total 
sugar content of 5 grams or more per 100 millilitres, and 24 pence per litre for those with 8 
grams or more per 100 millilitres. The levy was to apply to all sugar-sweetened beverages 
except pure fruit juices (with no added sugar) and drinks with a high milk content. Key 
supportive arguments appearing in the UK press centred on the extent of the health harm 
caused by excess sugar consumption; that such a policy was a necessary government 
intervention as part of a package of measures; and that voluntary industry codes, such as 
the Public Health Responsibility Deal, had been ineffective (6). Whereas opposition 
arguments emphasised that industry was already taking voluntary action and playing an 
active role in health promotion, therefore further regulation was unnecessary; any form of 
taxation would be ineffective in tackling the complex problem of obesity; and such 
measures would cause economic harm to industry and the wider economy (6).  
Successful implementation of ‘controversial’ health policies requires a high level of 
political commitment and support from advocacy stakeholders (20, 21). It has been argued 
that interest groups that present a united front may be more effective in having their 
preferred policy option adopted, than if they work separately (22). Indeed, Rasmussen and 
colleagues suggest that the likelihood of advocacy success increases when advocates 
publicly support each other’s position (23). Hawkins and McCambridge suggest that a factor 
in the failure to implement MUP in England was that health advocates were initially under-
prepared and did not present consistent arguments for the policy in the media (21). 
Conversely the complex corporate relationships that exist between unhealthy commodity 
industries may represent an opportunity for strategic cross-industry collaboration and result 
in more coherent alignment of media messaging when seeking to influence policy 
development (24-26). Smith and colleagues highlight the need for research to ‘better 
understand how processed food, soft drinks, and alcohol industries influence public, 
political, and policy debates’, in order to understand how to mitigate against industry 
messaging and successfully advocate for public health policy via the media (27). 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
This study seeks to address calls for research to compare stakeholder influencing 
activities across industry sectors (24, 25, 27). We use discourse network analysis (DNA), a 
research method that allows the analysis and visualisation of actor-based debates using 
network analysis, to explore the complex web of arguments, or discourse coalitions (28), 
that form when stakeholders seek to publicly influence government policy (29, 30). Previous 
studies have used DNA to describe the appearance of discourse coalitions in support of, and 
opposition to, MUP and SDIL (6, 7). In the recent commentary on Fergie et al, Schmidt 
highlights that this methodology is ‘likely to prove a particularly valuable tool for 
comparative research, allowing efficient, systematic, rigorous analysis to compare policy 
debates internationally and across multiple unhealthy products’ (31).  
Here we aim to build on our previous DNA studies and use this methodology to 
compare stakeholders’ positions in the discourse networks across two pricing policy 
debates, MUP for alcohol and the SDIL, as represented in UK newspapers. The comparison 
of MUP and SDIL is an appropriate case study as they are both examples of ‘sin taxes’ 
(pricing policies targeting products deemed harmful to society and individuals) (32, 33); 
intended to be UK wide policies; and attracted a very public debate in the news media; 
which in turn affected their chances of policy adoption. Specific research questions are: (i) 
What are the similarities and differences in the policy discourse networks’ composition and 
structure? (ii) How does the composition of coalitions differ across the two debates and 
what might this tell us about policy beliefs and advocacy strategies? (iii) How do the 
arguments that polarise the coalitions differ?  
 
Methods 
Pre-existing discourse network analyses on MUP (7) and SDIL (6) were employed as 
test cases to examine how DNA could be used as a comparative methodology. While the 
policy context was somewhat different for the two debates, both controversial policies drew 
significant media attention with clear polarisation in stakeholder views, thus providing a 
useful case study. Additionally, although MUP was only finally implemented in Scotland, it 
was originally proposed as a UK wide policy and included in the UK Government’s Alcohol 
Strategy (12).  
We searched articles from eleven national UK newspapers, representing all political 
views and genres, in the months preceding and following key policy announcements: 
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between May 2011 and November 2012 for the MUP debate; and between May 2015 and 
November 2016 for the SDIL debate. Stakeholder statements were identified and coded 
using the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) software (34), a qualitative content analysis 
software tool which combines category-based content analysis with network analysis (29, 
35). Each coded statement consists of four variables: the person’s name, their 
organisational affiliation, the argument to which the subject refers (further called 
“concept”), and a binary qualifier indicating the stakeholder’s agreement or disagreement 
with the concept. Weighted one-mode networks of stakeholders were created for both 
debates and exported from DNA as stakeholder × stakeholder matrices, using the ‘subtract’ 
transformation with ‘average activity normalisation’ (29). These procedures create a 
network in which a tie connects any two stakeholder nodes if they agree (more than they 
disagree) with each other, regarding the concepts in the debate. The methods used to 
create the separate policy discourse networks are described in detail elsewhere (6, 7). To 
allow comparison between the pricing debates, common concepts were harmonised 
wherever possible. For example, ‘The policy will reduce consumption of the commodity’ was 
used in favour of ‘MUP will reduce consumption of alcohol’ and ‘The SDIL will reduce 
consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages’. Concepts that were unique to only one 
debate were not harmonised; for example, ‘Industry plays an active role in public health 
promotion’ was specific only to the SDIL debate. For the MUP debate, 1,924 statements by 
152 people from 87 organisations were coded in 348 articles. For the SDIL debate, 3,883 
statements by 214 people from 175 organisations were coded in 511 articles. A total of 63 
concepts were identified. 29 concepts were common to both debates, 17 unique to MUP, 
and a further 17 unique to SDIL. See supporting information for a full list of concepts (Data 
S1) and stakeholder organisations (Data S2) appearing in each debate.  
Networks were plotted in Visone (a software tool that allows the visualisation and 
analysis of network structures in network datasets, such as those exported from the DNA 
software) (36). Ties between actors represent common agreement or common 
disagreement with a specific concept or argument. A tie weight threshold equivalent to the 
67th percentile was applied to the signed network to reduce ties to only relatively robust 
argumentative similarities and to maximise the identification of both network structures. 
The 67th percentile (equivalent tie weight thresholds 0.400 for MUP and 0.333 for SDIL) was 
selected to ensure that the networks could be directly compared. The Girvan-Newman 
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edge-betweenness community detection algorithm (an algorithm to identify clusters, or 
discourse coalitions, in the network, i.e.: groups of actors with a similar argumentative 
position) (37) was used to identify clusters of stakeholder subgroups with argumentative 
similarities within the discourse network. These clusters can be interpreted as discourse 
coalitions. The coalitions were then highlighted using blue hyperplanes, the different 
stakeholder types were visualised with common colours for both debates, and the 
frequency of codes for stakeholders was represented by the size of the respective node. 
Network measures were used to compare the two networks and principal coalitions 
regarding: size - the total number of nodes (actors) in a network or cluster, density – a 
measure of connectedness of actors within a network cluster or the overall network, 
expressing the relative number of ties (i.e.: the number of ties as a proportion of the 
theoretical maximum) (38), and E-I index – a measure of subgroup cohesion, i.e.: how 
strongly aligned the actors are internally in any one cluster vs external alignment with other 
clusters (39). The range for E-I index is -1 (all ties are internal to the coalition) to +1 (all ties 
are external to the coalition). 
We examined the relative use of concepts in each debate by comparing the 
frequency with which they were used and the degree of agreement and disagreement. The 
concepts that were the most polarising in each network were identified by: first, extracting 
the fifteen most frequently used concepts for MUP and SDIL separately; secondly, 
calculating the ratio of agreement to disagreement for each concept; and finally, ordering 
them by this ratio. As such, the five most polarising concepts were those with the highest 
ratio in each debate. 
The primary research question and analysis plan were not pre-registered and thus 
the results should be considered exploratory.  
 
Results 
Overview 
RQ (i) What are the similarities and differences in the policy discourse networks’ 
composition and structure? 
The composition of stakeholders in both networks was similar, reflecting the 
common interests of those participating in the debates. Both networks included Politicians / 
Political Parties; Government Advisory Bodies; Health Professionals / Professional 
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Associations; Health Charities / Advocacy Groups; Universities / Academics; Think-tanks / 
Commercial Researchers; Retailers / Retail Associations; Manufacturers / Associated 
Industries or Associations; and International Health Organisations. The only stakeholder 
types that did not appear in both debates were EU Member States / EU body and the Police, 
which exclusively appeared in the MUP debate (Figs 1 and 2). Wine producing EU Member 
States were particularly concerned about the legality of MUP, and the Police highlighted 
MUP as a way of dealing with the violence resulting from ‘problem drinkers’, two issues that 
were not prominent in the SDIL debate. The detailed composition and characteristics of 
each network have been published elsewhere (6, 7). In this article, we focus on the 
comparison between the two networks and their respective coalitions. 
 
The structure of both networks formed two discourse coalitions representing 
proponents and opponents of the policies. However, at the chosen tie-weight cut-off, the 
MUP coalitions are more distinct. Fewer stakeholders (total nodes) are engaged in the 
debate, with almost twice as many apparent in the SDIL network; 3.3 times as many in the 
proponents’ coalition and 1.7 times as many in the opponents’ coalition (Table 1). This 
reflects the greater number of vocal stakeholders in the SDIL debate, particularly in the 
proponents’ coalition. Additionally, the E-I index for proponents of SDIL is low compared 
with the other three coalitions (Table 1), indicating that members of this coalition were even 
more likely to agree with each other than with stakeholders outside the coalition, compared 
to the other coalitions.  
 
Composition of coalitions 
RQ (ii) How does the composition of coalitions differ across the two debates, and what 
might this tell us about policy beliefs? 
Highlighting the ten most active stakeholder organisations in each debate reveals 
that in both cases the commodity manufacturers and associated industry stakeholders 
(brown nodes) play prominent roles in opponents’ coalitions and are closely aligned with 
think tanks and commercial researchers (teal nodes) (Figs 3 and 4). Associations 
representing manufacturers of the products under scrutiny are dominant spokespeople in 
both debates, in particular: the Scottish Whisky Association and the Wine and Spirit Trade 
Association for MUP and the British Soft Drinks Association for SDIL. However, the SDIL 
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network also features a prominent manufacturer (Coca-Cola) and an association 
representing related industries (the UK Food and Drink Federation).  
 
The SDIL proponents’ coalition features active stakeholders from a wider range of 
public health advocates (government advisory bodies, particularly Public Health England 
(pink nodes) together with health charities and advocacy groups (purple nodes)) than seen 
in the MUP network. Six of the most active stakeholders are from these groups compared 
with only one (Alcohol Concern) for MUP. Other active stakeholders in the MUP proponents’ 
coalition are two professional associations (British Medical Association and the Royal 
College of Physicians) and one academic institution (University of Sheffield). While academic 
researchers are apparent in the SDIL network, they are not amongst the ten most prominent 
stakeholders appearing in this debate. 
Political stakeholders (gold nodes) appear across the two coalitions in both 
networks. However, only the Conservative party is among the most active stakeholders in 
the SDIL network, compared with four political parties in the MUP network (The 
Conservatives, Scottish National Party (SNP), Scottish Government and Scottish Labour). This 
reflects the origins of MUP as an SNP policy targeting what was framed as a Scottish issue of 
harmful drinking. In both networks, the Conservative party is towards the middle of the 
networks. However, in both cases this does not reflect a brokering role, but either a change 
in ideology over the course of the debate (for SDIL, the Conservative shift in position in the 
middle of the period studied), or splits within the party on the issue (for MUP, prominent 
politicians openly taking opposing positions over the course of the period studied). 
Despite similar patterns in the types of organisations making up the proponents’ and 
opponents’ coalitions across the two debates, only thirty organisational stakeholders are 
common to both (Table 2). This suggests that the debates are relatively sparsely connected 
to each other, through common stakeholders, despite their topical similarity. 
 
Apart from policymakers (political parties, government departments and advisory 
bodies), organisations from two other categories of stakeholders contribute to both the 
MUP and SDIL debates (Figs 5 and 6). Four think tanks and commercial researchers (Adam 
Smith Institute, Institute of Economic Affairs, Institute for Fiscal Studies and the TaxPayer’s 
Alliance) and six retailers or retail associations (Asda, Sainsbury’s, Tesco, British Retail 
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Consortium, Scottish Retail Consortium and Scottish Grocers Federation) appear in both 
debates. Think tanks and commercial researchers (teal nodes) appear exclusively in the 
opponents’ coalitions, while the retailers and retail associations (green nodes) spread across 
both coalitions in both debates. In relation to MUP, few retailers are central to the 
proponents’ coalition, unlike in the SDIL debate, where some retail stakeholders (e.g., 
Sainsbury’s and the British Retail Consortium) are integrated into the proponents’ coalition 
with strong belief ties to key policy proponents. 
 
It is noteworthy that, in contrast, there were no health charities or advocacy groups 
common to both debates, despite a range of these organisations being very active and 
central to the proponents’ coalitions within each debate. Similarly, while universities and 
academic researchers appear in one or other debate, only the University of Birmingham is 
common to both.  
 
Polarising arguments 
RQ (iii) How do the arguments that polarise the coalitions differ? 
Of the top five concepts that lead to the formation of coalitions in the two networks, 
two concepts are common to both (Table 3). ‘Policy is supported by the evidence’ is the 
most polarising concept for both networks and ‘Policy will reduce consumption of the 
commodity’ is the third and fourth most polarising concept for MUP and SDIL respectively. 
Three of the most polarising concepts are unique to one or other of the debates: ‘Policy will 
penalise responsible consumers’ for MUP; ‘Industry is taking voluntary actions’ and ‘Industry 
plays an active role in public health promotion’ for SDIL. Of note is the fact that the two 
most frequently cited arguments in the SDIL debate do not appear as significant polarising 
concepts, i.e.: ‘Policy needed to address commodity problem’ and ‘Commodity consumption 
causes health harm’. These concepts relate to the framing of the problem in relation to 
population-level health harm and the need for a policy response. Conversely, the two most 
frequently cited arguments in the MUP debate do result in network polarisation, i.e.: ‘Policy 
will reduce consumption of the commodity’ and ‘Policy is illegal’. In contrast, these concepts 
relate to the framing of the solution and its likely effectiveness and legality. Thus, the most 
frequently cited arguments in the SDIL debate do not result in polarisation of the network, 
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suggesting a high degree of agreement about the extent of the problem resulting in more 
closely integrated coalitions.  
 
Discussion 
There are calls for more nuanced analyses of stakeholder engagement in health 
policy development (24, 27, 31). It has been suggested that research should compare 
stakeholders across multiple unhealthy products and related policies (31). Using DNA 
methods this study presents the first direct comparison of the discourse coalitions that were 
evident in the UK press during the policy development processes for MUP and the SDIL. 
Both networks show similarities in terms of structure, proponents’ and opponents’ 
coalitions and similar stakeholder types. However, important differences are revealed in 
terms of network size and complexity; the relative prominence, and lack thereof, of key 
stakeholders; subtle differences in the position of industry sub-segments between 
networks; and the relative polarising impact of frequently cited arguments. 
Proponents of the pricing policies in both debates included public health, health 
charities, advocacy groups, and academics. While these stakeholders were present in both 
debates, few specific organisations were common to both, suggesting that such proponents 
tend to make media statements focusing on their area of policy interest. While it is clear 
that policy advocates are already working across sectors, for example: in the guise of the 
Cross Party Group on Improving Scotland’s Health: 2021 And Beyond (40); and health 
alliances across the UK and internationally, this study suggests that they may not optimise 
their media messaging with regard to pricing policies. WHO identifies such upstream policies 
as ‘best buys’ to tackle non-communicable diseases, across all lifestyle factors (41). There 
may be potential space for further cross-sector public health advocacy in support of pricing 
policies, by elevating the debate and presenting arguments across policy debates in support 
of their counterparts. Advocates could thus increase their chances of achieving policy 
congruence, as suggested by Rasmussen and others (23, 42). 
In contrast, opponents of regulatory pricing policies were present in both policy 
debates, specifically those with a vested interest in the economic impact of both policies 
such as retailers, representatives of licensed premises and commercial researchers. This 
structural similarity suggests industry stakeholders hold comparable discourse positions, 
supporting the idea of a common industry ‘playbook’, facilitated by public spokespeople, as 
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suggested by Petticrew et al (43). The same four free market think tanks and commercial 
researchers appear embedded in both opponents’ coalitions, closely tied to industry 
stakeholders, suggesting similar market justice rhetoric based on commercial ideology (44, 
45).  
Comparing alcohol and tobacco strategies, Savell and colleagues suggest that there 
are commonalities, including both sectors providing skewed interpretations of evidence 
whilst also promoting voluntary codes, based on establishing themselves as acting 
responsibly in relation to health (4). Our findings support this by suggesting that both sides 
focus on the availability and quality of evidence and this is the most significant polarising 
argument in both networks. There may be an opportunity for policy advocates and 
academics to focus their advocacy efforts in the media on stressing the importance of 
weight of evidence, strength of evidence, source of evidence and how it is best used. 
Polarising concepts appearing in the SDIL debate but absent in the MUP debate are ‘industry 
is taking voluntary action’ and ‘industry plays an active role in public health promotion’. This 
lends support to Nixon et al’s findings that the food and drinks industry seeks to establish 
themselves as an exceptional case that should not be subject to the same controls as 
producers of other health harming products, and is a key part of their corporate social 
responsibility rhetoric (6, 46). However, Collin et al highlight the linkages that exist across 
tobacco, alcohol and ultra-processed food companies, positing the idea of a single 
unhealthy commodity industry requiring a consistent regulatory approach (2).  
A key difference between the two networks is the number and distribution of 
associated industry stakeholders such as retailers and restaurants, with a greater number in 
the SDIL network, including the active voice of the UK Food and Drink Federation. Six key 
retailers are common to both debates but appear in different positions. For example, the 
British Retail Consortium and Sainsbury’s appear as proponents of SDIL and opponents of 
MUP, whereas Tesco occupies inverse positions. This, together with wider industry 
engagement in the SDIL debate, reinforces the need to clearly define industry sub-segments 
and their likely policy positions, as suggested by Collin et al (24). Policy advocates may 
benefit from understanding the policy responses of multiple industry sub-segments to 
effectively counter policy objections and leverage potential policy support. 
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One of the limitations of this study, which examines the debates as static networks, 
is that it does not allow analysis of subtle shifts over time. While the change in position of 
the Conservative Party in the SDIL debate was the only fundamental change in ideological 
position, there was an ongoing interplay of subtle shifts in emphasis and relative 
prominence of arguments over time in both debates. Future studies would benefit from 
comparing network development over time. Secondly, harmonising the concepts for the 
two debates may have resulted in the loss of some nuanced arguments. However, the 
coders of the two debates worked together to ensure consistency and minimise this risk. 
Thirdly, the periods studied for each debate were four years apart: 2011-12 for MUP and 
2015-16 for SDIL. The passage of time could have influenced stakeholders’ strategies and 
the nature of their responses to proposed fiscal policy. However, we chose these time 
periods deliberately to examine the debates at similar stages of policy development. Finally, 
while we recognise the importance the digital world of echo chambers, tailored information 
and micro-targeting, which means that social media plays an increasing role in influencing 
the policy agenda (47), traditional newspapers remain an important barometer of the 
current political agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this visualisation of the discourse networks apparent in the debates on 
pricing policies spanning two unhealthy commodity industries, may represent a 
manifestation of the underlying discursive strategies, that is manipulation or framing of a 
set of arguments by actors in order to achieve a certain goal, employed by policy 
stakeholders to influence policy makers and the public, via the news media. The network 
comparison is suggestive of greater cross-sector collaboration among policy opponents than 
proponents. Our analysis also suggests that, in seeking policy congruence, there may be a 
space for further cross-sector public health advocacy, by presenting arguments across policy 
debates in support of their counterparts. However, we recognise there are potential barriers 
to this model, not least resource constraints and the risk of mission creep for some public 
health advocates. Given the limited presence of academic institutions across the networks, 
and the importance of statements relating to evidence in polarising both networks, we 
suggest academics contribute more frequently on issues relating to evidence in policy 
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debates. Finally, we suggest that DNA could usefully be applied to compare other policy 
debates over time and across countries, in attempting to tackle NCDs. 
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Table 1: Network comparisons 
Network measures MUP SDIL 
Whole network   
Total nodes 87 175 
Total ties 617 2,463 
Density 8% 8% 
Proponents coalition   
Nodes 33 109 
Total ties 365 1,900 
Internal ties 287 1,739 
External ties 78 161 
Ties to opponents’ coalition 60 155 
Density 27% 15% 
EI index -0.57 -0.83 
Opponents coalition   
Nodes 35 60 
Total ties 301 715 
Internal ties 231 558 
External ties 70 157 
Ties to proponents’ coalition 60 155 
Density 19% 16% 
EI index -0.53 -0.56 
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Table 2: Common stakeholders appearing in both networks 
Politician / Political Party Conservatives / Labour / Liberal Democrats 
Scottish Conservatives / Scottish Labour / Scottish 
Liberal Democrats / SNP / UK Government / UK 
Government Department of Health / HM Treasury 
Government Advisory Body Chief Medical Officer / Health Select Committee /  
Local Government Association 
Health Professional /  
Professional Association 
British Medical Association / Royal College of 
Physicians  
/ Faculty of Public Health / NHS 
Health Charity / Advocacy Group  
University / Academic Researcher University of Birmingham 
Think Tank / Commercial 
Researcher 
Adam Smith Institute / Institute of Economic Affairs 
/ Institute for Fiscal Studies / TaxPayers’ Alliance 
Retailer / Retail Association Asda / Sainsbury’s / Tesco / British Retail 
Consortium / Scottish Retail Consortium / Scottish 
Grocers Federation 
Manufacturer / Associated 
Industry or Association 
British Beer & Pub Association / JD Wetherspoon 
International Health Organisation  
EU Member State or EU body  
Police  
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Table 3: Most polarising concepts used and level of prominence in each debate 
Rank as a polarising concept in the MUP debate Prominence1 
MUP 
Prominence 
SDIL 
Policy is supported by evidence 1 13 8 
Responsibility deals with industry are ineffective 2 16 21 
Policy will reduce consumption of commodity 3 1 3 
Policy will penalise responsible consumers2 4 6 - 
Policy is illegal 5 2 35 
    
Rank as a polarising concept in the SDIL debate  Prominence 
SDIL 
Prominence 
MUP 
Policy is supported by evidence 1 8 13 
Industry taking voluntary action2 2 5 - 
Policy will improve population health 3 4 3 
Policy will reduce consumption of commodity 4 3 1 
Industry plays an active role in public health 
promotion2 
5 13 - 
    
1 Prominence indicates relative frequency of use in each debate (rank 1 = most frequently 
used) 
2 Italics = concept unique to one network 
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Figure 1: MUP DNA network showing stakeholder organisations colour coded by stakeholder type  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tie weight cut-off at 67th percentile, i.e.: <0.400. Nodes sized by frequency in the debate. 
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Figure 2: SDIL DNA network showing stakeholder organisations colour coded by stakeholder type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tie weight cut-off at 67th percentile, i.e.: <0.333. Nodes sized by frequency in the debate. 
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Figure 3: DNA network highlighting the 10 most active stakeholder organisations in the MUP debate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BMA = British Medical Association 
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Figure 4: DNA network highlighting the 10 most active stakeholder organisations in the SDIL debate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOF = National Obesity Forum 
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Figure 5: DNA network illustrating where stakeholder organisations common to both debates appear 
in the MUP network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BMA = British Medical Association 
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Figure 6: DNA network illustrating where stakeholder organisations common to both debates appear 
in the SDIL network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BMA = British Medical Association 
 
 
